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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

PHI KAPPA IOTA FRATERNITY,
a non-profit corporation, and DR.
FLOYD F. HATCH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation, EARL J. GLADE, FRED
TEDESCO, JOHN B. MATHESON, L. C. ROMNEY, City Commissioners; CLEVE WOOLEY and
W. Y. TIPTON,

Case No. 7357

Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
All ·page references used .are those of the record.
The parties are referred to as in the court below. All
italics are ours, unless otherwise indicated.
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This is an action by the plaintiff for a declaratory
judgment brought under the permissive authority of
Title 104, Chapter 64, Utah Code Annotated 1943. It
challenges the validity of a certain Salt Lake City ordinance which restricts the location of fraternity and
sorority houses in residential ''A'' districts. In their
complaint the plaintiffs seek to have the court declare
the ordinance to be discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious
and unconstitutional; and the plaintiffs seek injunctive
relief to prevent the enforcement of the ordinance
against the plaintiffs.
In the complaint it is alleged that the plaintiff,
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity, is a non-profit corporation,
affiliated with the University of Utah; that it owns and
occupies a fraternity hou.se as an ordinary appurtenance to the University of Utah; that the plaintiff Floyd
F. Hatch, is an owner of real property used for residential purposes by him and his family, which· property
is located within 600 feet of the University of Utah
main campus and is designated as 1363 Butler Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
The complaint further alleges that, pursuant to
its corporate purposes, the plaintiff fraternity on the
27th day of August, 1948, purchased a residential unit
which they occupy -as a fraternity house, designated by
the street address of 1175 2nd Avenue; that said fraternity house is located within residential ''A'' district
as defined under Section 6715, Chapter 65, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944. The complaint
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

alleges that the plain tiff fraternity has expended large
sums of money in purchasing and furnishing s.aid housing unit. The complaint further alleges that the defendants haYe ordered the plaintiff fraternity to vacate
the property, to cease using said property as a fraternity house, and have threatened to issue criminal
complaints in the event the order is not obeyed; that
the defendants in the past have enforced said ordinance
according to their interpretation of its terms and have
compelled fraternities and sororities appurtenant to the
the University of Utah to locate their establishments
within 600 feet of the University of Utah campus; that
to the east of the University of Utah campus are mountains upon which there are no utilities for sewage water;
electrical power or otherwise and that said land is totally unsuited to housing projects, that to the south of
the main University of Utah campus is a cemetery which
is not suitable for the occupancy of living persons, that
to the west of the University of Utah campus there is
not available any property within 600 feet suitable for
occupancy by fraternities and sororities; that as a result
of such situation a large number of fraternities and
sororities have been crowded into an area immediately
north of the University of Utah campus, and as a result
of such crowding and congestion the public safety, convenience., and health have been greatly endangered; that
as a further result thereof the plaintiff Dr. Floyd F.
Hatch and other ·p·roperty owners within the area 600
feet north from the University .of Utah campus have
suffered a diminution of value to their property, that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the use and enjoyment thereof have been lessened because of the crowded streets and the noise .and disturbance resulting from the overcrowded conditions. That
the property of plaintiff, Dr. Floyd F. Hatch and of
the other property owners in the vicinity to the north
of the University of Utah campus is all located in residential ''A'' district under th~ aforesaid zoning ordinance.
The complaint further alleges that said zoning ordinance is .arbitrary, discriminatory and capricious and
is not proper exercise of any of the police powers of
Salt Lake City, but on the contrary said ordinance results in unsafe streets, inadequate housing conditions,
and parking facilities, congestion of p~eople and noise,
all of which disturb the peace and quiet of DT. Floyd
F. Hatch and other property owners residing within
residential "A" district and within 600 feet of the University of Utah campus; that the said ordinance is arbitrary, discriminatory and capricious in the following
particulars :
A. That there is no reasonable basis for permitting fraternity organizations to maintain fraternity
houses in residential ''A'' district and at same time
limiting them to locations within 600 feet of the land
and premises occupied by the University of Utah to
which they are incident, that the enforcement of such
a restriction is prejudicial to and discriminatory against
the plaintiff Floyd F. H:atch and to the other ·p.roperty
owners in residential ''A'' district who own and ocSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cupy property 'Yithin 600 feet of the University of
Utah campus.
B. That said ordinance expressly permits the construction of schools in all residential ''A'' districts
and also specifically permits any use ordinarily appurtenant to the uses of the property for school purposes
including the establishment of dormitories, fraternities,
sororities and boarding houses occupied by ·students and
faculty members of the schools; that said ordinance
puts no restriction on the location of fraternity and
sorority houses incident to or appurtenant to private
schools and that under the terms of said z.oning ordinance, fraternities appurtenant to private schools may
build their fraternity homes at any location within the
residential ''A'' district; that said ordinance then prohibits the maintenance of fraternity houses incident to
public schools in all residential ''A'' districts except
within 600 feet of the lands and premises occupied by
the institution to which they are incident. That there
is no reasonable basis for such distinction between fraternity houses of public and fraternity houses of priv·ate
schools, and the same is discriminatory, arbitrary, and
capricious, as to the ~plaintiff fraternity.
C. That there is no reasonable basis to justify
the selection of the distance of 600 feet as the area within
which fraternity houses must be confined. That said
distance or limitation is made by said ordinance without
regard to street or property lines and in effect discriminates against fraternities and sororities incident to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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University of Utah only and was designed to confine
fraternities and sororities of the University of Utah
to the locations existing when said ordinance was enacted, without regard to future growth and development
of the school.
D. That the ordinance permits one and two family
dwellings in residential ''A'' district, and there is no
limit to the number of persons who may reside on premises described .as two family dwellings within a residential ''A'' district, even though said persons are boarders,
lodgers ·Or renters and there is no limitation of the number of persons who may reside on premises described
as one family dwellings in residential ''A'' district,
except that no more than six persons may reside therein
as lodgers or boarders paying rent. That it is discriminatory, and arbitrary to prohibit the use of one
and two family dwellings for residential purposes by
members of a fraternity appurtenant to a public school.
E. That there is no reasonable basis for :placing
fraternities in a restricted classification insof:ar as the
maintenance of a fraternity house is concerned.
The complaint further alleges that since the ordinances restricting fraternities to 600 feet from the
premises occupied by the University of Utah was passed,
that the University of Utah has more than doubled in
size and enrollment. That recently the University of
Utah acquired approximately 300 acres of land which
was formerly part of Fort Douglas Military Reservation and that there-after Salt L·ake City enacted a new
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ordinance by the terms of which all property within six
hundred feet of said newly acquired property was placed
in the residential district "AA". That the effect of
this later ordinance has been to further restrict and
concentrate the development of fraternities in the area
immediately surrounding the property of the ·plaintiff
Hatch.

In their answer, the defendants allege that the ordinances complained of are within the powers granted to
Salt Lake City by law to enact an·d that the advisability
and wisdom of such ordinances are not within the province of the court to review, such matter being solely
within the discretion and good judgment of the Board
of City Commissioners of Salt Lake City. Upon the
issues thus joined, the case was tried before the Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, sitting without a jury and
on February 28, 1949 a decree was entered by the trial
court deciding the issues in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action,. dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint, and dissolving the temporary
injunction. From that decree the plaintiff,s have prosecuted this appeal.
THE FACTS
In 1937 a grou·p of residents of Salt Lake City, re- .
siding in the residential ''A'' area involved in this case,
petitioned the City Commission of Salt Lake City for
an amendment of Chapter 47, Section 4710 of the Building Code of Salt Lake City, restricting the location of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dormitories :and fraternity or sorority houses to an
area within one-eighth of a mile distance from the lands
and premises occupied by the institution to which they
were incident. This petition was referred to the City
Planning and Zoning commission and by them returned
to the Commission on December 16, 1938, with the recommendation that the petition be granted, the distance
being modified from one-eighth of a mile to 600 feet
(.Exhibit A). A hearing was held u·pon the petition and
the Commission ordered the Zoning ordinances changed
(Exhibit B), and thereupon S·ection 6715, Chapter

~5,

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944 was adopted.
That ordinance, so far as material here, reads as follows:
''Section 6715. Residential 'A' district.
(a) In residential 'A' district no building or
premises shall be us-ed or maintained, and no
building shall be erected or altered so as to be
arranged, intended or designed to be used for
other than one of the following uses:

1.

One-family dwellings.

2.

Two-family dwellings.

3.

Schools.

* * *
(b) In a Residential 'A' district buildings and
· uses, such as are ordinarily appurtenant to any
of the uses listed above, but not involving the
conduct. o~ b~siness, s~all be. permitted, subject
to the hnntat1ons herem provided.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1. Accessory uses customarily incident to the
above uses.

* * * *
5. In a one-family d'velling the renting of
rooms to not more than six (6) persons for lodging purposes only, or the furnishing of table
board to not more than six (6) persons, or the
furnishing a combination of the ·abov-e to not
more than six (6) persons; provided} however,
that these provisions shall not be applicable to
a two-fa-mily dwelling.

6. Dormitories, frat·ernity or sorority houses
or boarding houses occupied only by the faculty
or students of a public ed!uc.ationa·l ins.titution
and supervised by the authorities thereof, sUJbject, however, to the eaApress condition that such
houses shall· not be locat·ed or establishe.d more
than 600 feet distant from the lands and premises occupied by the institution to which they
are incident.
The 600-feet restriction had no application, except
with reference to the· University of Utah (R. 106-105).
That restriction was chosen because the petition first
requested one-eighth (Ys) of a mile and that distance
embraced all existing fraternity and sorority houses,
except the one at 51 Wolcott Street and the one ·at 1371
East South Temple (R. 110). The fact that a "bunch"
of people by petition stated they didn't want fraternities in their district :and indicated they wanted the distance 600 feet is primarily the reason the distance was
so fixed (R. 113). The amendment was directed to the
vicinity contiguous to the University and it was in that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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particular district alone that they were concerned. When
the 600-foot. restriction was adopted, no p·lace other than
the University area w:as studied at the time. (R. 114 Exhibit C). Indeed, there are no schools in Salt Lake
City other than the University of Utah that have fraternities or sororities (R. 55).
The City Planning Engine-er testified that the zoning work of Salt Lake City had been under his charge
ever since it was established except for 1927. He stated
that the portion of the A district that is within the
600-foot limit is equally w·ell suited for fine residential
homes as the area outside of that limit (R. 93). The
only reason for holding the 600-foot restriction was to
keep the students close to the campus and to cut down
the added traffic congestion incident to fraternity and
sorority houses (R. 94). The additional traffic congestion caused by fraternity houses w.as one of the
strong reasons to segregate fraternity and sorority
houses, and where they are segregated, like the one at
51 North Wolcott, there is ample parking space and
there is no particular parking problem (R. 101-102).
Out of the eighteen fraternities that have homes, there
is only one aside from the plaintiff that isn't congested
within the '600 foot area. There are sixteen fraternities
within the 600-foot zone north of the campus (R. 100).
In the 600-foot area the streets are more than full with
traffic and parking (R. 101). The zoning expert admitted that it would be a disadvantage to the p·roperty
owners on Butler Avenu·e (where Plaintiff Hatch re..
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sides) to have the five ne"~ groups that are looking for
homes, locate within the 600-foot zone, which is very
congested right now, and yet it is equally well suited to
residential purposes as the AA district (R. 104). The
more congested and numerous fraternities are around
a giYen house, the more onerous it is (R. 131). Two
sorority houses have been built on Butler Avenue since
the plaintiff moved there. The congestion and parking along Butler Avenue has increased since 1939. Parking has become solid almost ;all the way down the street,
particularly on Monday and Friday evenings when
meetings and parties are held. Even during the time
when the University is not in session, at night, and at
times when there are no functions at Kingsbury Hall,
there is a crowded and congested condition in the evening (R.. 135). There is a lot of parking, particularly
at the Alphi Phi and Phi Mu houses on Monday and
week-ends, -and the organizations on First South -also
park on Butler Avenue (R. 136).
The streets on North Wolcott and Second Avenue
are noticeably wider than on Butler Avenue or Federal
Way, and there being fewer fraternities on Wolcott
and Second Avenue, it is possible to get parking space
and there is not so much likelihood of the street· being
blocked by parking on an angle (R. 139-140). The fraternity and sorority students at the University of Utah
own 282 cars in addition to which a number of the students drive cars from time to time belonging to their
parents (R. 76). The zoning expert did not think that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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all fraternities should be crowded into the 600 foot
strip (R. 103).
The second reason given why it was desirable to
confine the fraternities and sororities into the 600 foot
area was to have them located closer to the campus.
The effect of the ordinance is to drive fraternities to
the more distant B zones or to crowd them into the
already congested area to the north of the campus.
East of the campus is closed by th·e military reservation and south of the campus is closed by the cemetery;
the north of the campus is closed beyond the 600 foot
strip in the immediate vicinity of Butler Avenue by
the AA zoning (R. 103, Exhibit 1, Exhibit D). Along
the west side of the campus there are churches and a
business section and residences. There is a city water
pool and a city park on the northwest corner of the
campus. There are no fraternities or sororities located
in the area west of 13th East and generally :all the fraternity and sorority houses of the University are located
in the area beginning on the corner of First South east
of Wolcott, north about two blocks to the Phi Kappa
house and west to University Street (R. 58-59). There
are ·twelve fraternities and seven fraternities that have
houses in the area of First South and Perry Avenue
(R. 60). Most of the homes between the Emery House
on Second South and Carleson Hall on Fifth South are
rather small (R. 109). Other than the 600 :f.oot area to
the north, fraternities must look to the more distant
B zones. (See zoning map)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It \\-as stipulated that the court may take judicial
notice -of all the planning ordinances of the City prior
to and subsequent to 1939 (R. 79). It was also stipulated that the red line on Exhibit D that goes up through
the center of the map is the present 600-foot line from
the University campus (R. 79) ~ and the heavy green
line that comes up the south side of South Temple and
follows the South Side of Federal Way and then on
up through the center of the map is the boundary for
the AA zone. The location of the various fraternities
and sororities are indicated on this map at th.e houses
and addresses noted, and it was stipuluated that the
map correctly shows what it purports to represent
(R. 80).
In the interpretation of its ordinances, the city had
denied to a fraternity the right to move into the Carter
home which was on a lot that was partially within and
partly outside of the 600 foot limit (R. 97).
The witness, Don Ogden, testified that he is president of the plaintiff fraternity (R. 71); that he spent
as much time as he could along with the committee, two
assistants, to hunt for a suitable house, but that the
only house available within the 600 feet limit was the
Adams home and the owner wanted $40,000 cash. for
that home; that for the entire year, they searched
through the areas around the campus for a home, including the area west of the campus (R. 72); that they
exhausted every effort within the 600 foot limit and
within the Butler district looking for a home (R. 73).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That on August 27th, 1948, the plaintiff fraternity entered into a contract to purchase the property located
at 1175 Second Avenue for $35,000, p:ayable $500.00
down ; $4500 on possession or on or before September
15th, 1948, and $2000 on or before three months from
the date of :possession; that all payments have been
kept up on the contract except the last $2,000 and arrangements were in process in regard to that sum. That
the plaintiff fraternity entered into possession on or
about September 12th, 1948 (R. 74). It was not necessary to remodel the home to :adapt it to fraternity
uses. There are four car garages back of the house and
a cement patio that will park about 8 cars plus a long
driveway that would accommodate another 6 or 8 cars,
in :addition to the front footage of the house. That 25
students were then residing at the house and the house
would amply provide housing for 30 or more (R. 75).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. That the court erred in its finding that the
said ordinance Section 6715 of Chapter 65, of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944 is not
unreasonably discriminatory, arbitrary or capricious in
any of the particulars alleged by plaintiffs or otherwise,
but is valid and constitutional, in that such finding is
not supported by and is against the weight of the evidence.
2. That the court erred in failing to find th:at as
a result of the congestion of the fraternities and sororiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ties within the 600 foot area immediately north of the
University of Utah eampus the public safety, convenience and health have been greatly ·endangered.
3. That the court erred in failing to find that as a
further result of the congestion of the fraternities and
sororities within the "600 foot area, the plaintiff Dr.
Floyd F. Hatch has suffered detriment in the us-e, enjoyment and value of his property.
4. That the court erred in its finding Number 7
and each part thereof in that such finding is not supported by and is against the weight of the evidence.
5. That the court erred in failing to find that the
zoning ordinance is arbitrary, discriminatory and capricious and is not a proper exercise of any of the
police powers of Salt Lake City and in failing to find
that it, results in congested an·d unsafe streets, inadequate housing conditions, and congestion of people and
noise.
6. That the court erred in failing to find that the
allegations of Paragraph IX (a) of plaintiff's complaint
are true.
That the court erred in failing to find that the
allegations of Paragraph IX (b) of the complaint are
true.
7.

8. That the court erred in failing to find that the
allegations of Paragraph IX (c) of the complaint are
true.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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9. That the court erred in failing to find that the
allegations of Paragraph IX (d) of the complaint are
true.
10. That the court .erred in failing to find that the
allegations of Paragraph IX (e) of the complaint are
true.
11. That the court erred in failing to declare the
ordinance to be discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious
and unconstitutional.

12. That the court erred in refusing to p~ermanently
enjoin the defendants from attempting to enforce
the ordinance against the !plaintiff fraternity or from
attempting to enforce the said ordinance so as to compel additional fraternity units to locate within the vicinity of the plaintiff Hatch.
13. That the court erred in its finding Number 6
and each part thereof, s:aid finding being unsupported
by and against the weight of the evidence.
ARGUMENT

POINT ONE
The ordinance is unconstitutional because:
A. The ordinance unreasonably discriminates between fraternities affiliated with public schools and
fraternities affiliated with private schools.
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B.

The ordinance unreasonably discriminates bet"~een two family dwellings and fraternity and sorority
houses and dormitories.
C. The ordinance unreasonably disc rim in ate s
against the property of Plaintiff Hatch.
D. The ordinance is unreasonably discriminatory
in that it is directed only against the University of Utah
and fraternities and sororities appurtenant thereto.
E. The 600-foot restriction is arbitrary, capricious and without any reasonable basis.
F. There is no constitutional basis for segregating
from residential users, ·p.ersons who use residential prop'erty for fraternity and sorority houses.

THE ORDINANCE UNREASONABLY DJS-CRIMINATES BETWEEN FR·ATERNITIES AFFILIATED WITH PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND FRATERNITIES AFFILIATED WITH PRIVATE S,CHOOLS.
A.

A mere reaqing of the ordinance will demonstrate
that "Schools" may locate anywhere in Residential
''A'' district. This of course, includes both public
schools and private schools.
The ordinance next provides (subsection [b]) that
"buildings and uses" ordinarily appurtenant to schools
may he maintained in Residential ''A'' district. It thus
seems crystal clear that schools, both public and private,
together with buildings and uses ordinarily appurtenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ant to schools, public or private, may be located and
maintained anywhere in Residential ''A'' district.
Subsection (a) of the ordinance does not, of course,
deal with any appurtenant uses. Subsection (a) contains the list of ·primary uses. It is then followed with
subsection (b) which permits appurtenant uses subject
to the "limitations" contained ther-ein. Then follow 7
subdivisions, each one of which interprets and limits
various types of appurtenant uses. Subdivision 1 of
subsection (b) limits other uses to uses ''customarily
incident.'' Subdivision 2 limits the business of :a physician, musician or other professional person to his dwelling". Subdivision 3 limits the size of signs and their
contents. Subdivision 4 also places limitations on signs,
their size and location. Subdivision 5 pl.aces limitations
on the number of lodgers or boarder·s permitted in a
.''single-family dwelling.'' Subdivision 6 limited dormitories, fraternity and sorority houses of public institutions, to houses occupied only by faculty or students
and supervised by the institution. Subdivision 7 limits
the size of a private garage and its location on the lot.
In short, the ordinance in question sets up this general pattern: Subsection (a) ·expr·essly permits certain
primary uses in Residential ''A'' district. Subdivision
(b) permits uses ordinarily appurtenant to one of the
primary uses set forth in subsection (a). Subsection
(b) then proceeds to int·erpret, define, and limit various
appurtenant uses. All uses which are accessory uses and
are customarily incident to the primary uses are interSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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preted in the other subdivisions and limitations are imposed thereon. Of course, the general language of subsection (b) would p·ermit other ''ordinarily appurtenant
uses'' even though they were not specified in one of the
seven subdivisions and even though no specific limitations were imposed thereon.
There is of course, independent of ordinance, an
absolute right on the part of a property owner to utilize
it as he sees fit, so long as he does not create a public
or a private nuis·ance. It is therefore, to a certain extent, erroneous to look to the ordinance for the grant
of a right to maintain a fraternity house in residential
"A" district. Rather, we should look to the terms of
the ordinance to see what uses are prohibited because
all uses not prohibited, of course, are ·p·ermitted. No
matter how the ordinance quoted above, be construed,
it will result in discrimination b·etween public and private schools. By the express terms of the statute schools,
both public and private, are permitted to locate in residential ''A''. Whether Section 6 be considered as a
grant of the right to fraternities to locate in residential
"A", or as we contend, a limitation on fraternities of
public schools, it nevertheless is limited only to fraternities and sororities incident to public institutions. Fraternities and sororities incident to private schools are
not covered at all by Section 6. It is absolutely impossible to escape this conclusion. The reference in subsection (a) to "schools", must be construed to include
all schools. See 'Western Thea ..Seminary vs. Eva.nston,
331 Ill. 257, 162 N. E. 863. The reference to fraternity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

houses and sorority houses incident to ''public educational institutions'' certainly eliminates those attached
to private schools, so that there is a distinction made
between fraternity :and sorority houses incident to public
schools and those incident to ·private schools. As we
will demonstrate by the cases to follow, there is no constitutional basis for such a distinction.
It is common knowledge that dormitories, fraternity
houses and sorority houses are ''ordinarily appurtenant to'' the operation of schools, both public and private. The evidence made that clear, but court cases
involving that point are very difficult to find.
W·e did find one case which clearly· holds that dormitories are ap.purtenant to, and ordinarily incident to
the opera ti9n of private schools. See the case of Western
Theological Seminary vs. City of Evanston, 331 Ill. 257,
162 N. E. 863. There, an ordinance permitted in residential "A" district, (1) Single-family houses, (2)
Churches and Temples, ( 3) Libraries, (4) Schoqls and
Colleges. (5) Farming and Truck gardening.
The Western Theological Seminary elected to construct
a dormitory in connection with the school. A dispute
and a law suit ensued. The city, in opposition to the
construction of the dormitory, amended its ordinance
under pTessure from the local citizens, and in the
amended ordinance provided that only such schools as
had the power of emine~t domain could locate in residential ''A'', thus making a distinction between public
and private schools. This was held unconstitutional in
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a prior case. See Western Theological S e JJrina ry v. City
of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156 N. E. 778. The ordinance "1'as then amended to permit public and p·rivate
schools but as amended it expressly excluded dormitories. The court in holding that the construction of dormitories "~as ordinarily incident to schools, and that no
ordinance could constitutionally permit schools to exist
in residential "A" area, and at the same time prohibit
the construction of dormitories, said that dormitories
are ''buildings ordinarily forming a part of the equipment and plant of colleges, and the fact that dormitories
were proposed to be erected, did not justify the passage
of the amended ordinance.'' The ordinance which proposed to permit schools, both p1Jblic and p·rivate, to exist
in residential ''A'' district, but to prohibit the construction of· dormitories as an incident thereto, was held to
be unconstitutional. The court thus clearly held that
the operation of a dormitory was a use ordinarily appurtenant or incident to the operation of a college.
We have been unable to locate any other cases discussing the question of whether or not dormitories and
fraternities are ordinarily incident or appurtenant to
colleges. We have, however, located several cases discussing the question of ap·p.urtenant uses. The case
of Kenney vs. Building Commissioner of Melrose, Mass.
53 N. E. 2d. 683, held that it was a proper "accessory
use'' to a class ''A'' residence to build and operate a
small conservatory for the raising of p·lants and flowers
for the .personal pleasure of the resident.
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In the case of Village of St. Louis Park vs. Casey,
Minn., 16 N. W. 2d. 459, the court held that the construction and operation of radio equipment consisting
of a large pole and wires located outside of the home,
even where the equipment installed in connection therewith, exceeded in cost $10,000.00, was an accessory use to
a class ''A'' dwelling.
In Provo City vs. Claudin, 91 Utah 60, 63 P. 2d 570,
the Utah Supreme Court held that it was so obvious that
a funeral home was not an ordinary accessory or incidental use for a dwelling that the matter did not warrant discussion.
These are the only cases we have been able to find
which discuss appurtenant uses or ordinary accessory
or incidental uses in connection with zoning ordinances.
The word, "appurtenant", as it applies generally, is
defined in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 6 ·page 139.
There are perhap.s a hundred different definitions given.
We believe that in line with the Illinois holding, fraternities, sororities, and dormitories ordinarily are appurtenant uses to schools. In fact, the Illinois case went
so far as to hold that they were so much an appurtenant
use thereof, that it was unconstitutional to put schools
in residential "A'', and prohibit the location of dormitories in residential ''A''.
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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
There are numerous rases holding that it is unconstitutional to distinguish between public and private
schools.
In one of the later cases, Catholic Bishop vs. Kingery, (Ill.) 20 X. E. 2d, 583, the ordinance, according to
the court provided :
''Section 3 and 3a of the ordinance provide
that no building shall be used or thereafter
erected or altered with the 'A residential' districts
unless otherwise provided by the ordinance except for the necessary use to which anyone of
the following places or establishments may be
put: Single family dwelling, church or temple,
public school, library ... ''
In holding this bad the court said :
''Examination of the ordinance before us reveals that it expressly permits a public school
to be maintained in the 'A Residential' section
but prohibits the existence of a private or parochial school. The only question before us then
is this: Does an ordinance which permits the
maintenance of a public school but excludes the
operation of a private school within the same
area bear any substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or welfare~
"The Catholic Bishop ·Of Chicago proposes to
erect a parochial school and chapel up~on the
property in question. We fail to perceive . to
what degree a Catholic school of this type will be
more detrimental or dangerous to the public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

health than a public school. It is not pointed out
to us just how the pupils in attendance at the
parochial school are any more likely to jeopardize the public safety than the public school pupils. Nor can we arbitrarily conclude that the
prospective students of the new school will seriously undermine the general welfare.''
In City of Miami Beach vs. State, ex rel Lear, 128
Fla. 750, 175 So. 537, the court held that to prohibit
private school while permitting public school is arbifrary and invalid. Said th·e Court:
"It will be noted that the ordinance as amended specifically permits the conducting of public
schools within the prescribed zone and prohibits
the conducting of private schools of all sorts
therein. The prohibiting classification finds no
foundation or basis in reason or experience that
has been brought to our attention.
"What objectionable characteristic touching
the comfort or other general welfare of the surrounding community may obtain as to a private
school which would not probably obtain in a
greater degree as to a public school has not been
suggested, and, we think for the very good reason
that none exists. For this reason alone the ordinance as amended, must be held to be arbitrary.''
See also Western Theological Seminary vs. Evanston, 331 Ill. 257, 162 N. E. 863 to the same effect.
See also Alpha Rho Alumni Ass'n vs. City of New
Brunswick, (N. J.) 18 A. 2d. '68, which held that it was
unconstitutional to distinguish between College fraterniSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties and other fraternal organizations. There the statute
in question. gayp a tax exemption for property used in
\York of or for the purpose of fraternal organizations.
The Act then expressly excluded ''college clubs, college lodges or college fraternities.'' The court held that
the attempted distinction \Yas invalid because it was
without any reasonable basis.
\\. . e \Yere lmable to find any authority the other
\Yay on this point.

B. THE ORDINANCE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIJIINATES BETWEEN TWO-FAMILY
DWELLINGS AND SORORITY AND FRATER:NITY
HOUSES A?\7D DORMITORIES.
Our next contention is that the ordinance permits
unrestricted use of two-family dwellings for the maintenance of roomers and boarders. The evidence shows
that the house at 1175 Second Avenue, ·operated by the
plaintiff fraternity was a single-family dwelling. Th.at
it is now being occupied by the plaintiff fraternity,
without any structural alterations of any kind whatsoever; the only difference being, that instead of a single
blood family residing in said home, the occupants thereof now are students .at the University of Utah, living
together with a common housekeeping unit.
In this connection the ordinance is altogether silent
in prescribing rules with respect to the occupants of two
family dwellings. There is nothing to prohibit a large
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number of people from occupying a two family dwelling
without regard to the facilities available in such dwelling, sanitary or otherwise, to accommodate the occupants. An ordinance is altogether ineffective to promote the public welfare, safety, or health, which permits
an unlimited number of persons to occup;y a two family
dwelling without regard to its facilities, and yet p;revents a fraternity from occupying a home equipped
with ample facilities, sanitary and otherwise, to accommodate its members who reside there while attending
the University of Utah. We do not perceive in what
manner the public safety, welfare, or health is thus
promoted by the ordinance.
Section 6713, of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, 1944, defines the word family as follows:
" 'Family'. Any number of individuals living together as a single housekeeping unit, and
doing their cooking on the premises independent
of and separated from any other group or
family."
Two-family dwelling is described by the same section
as follows, to-wit:
'''Two-family' dwelling. A building arranged
or designed to be occupied. by two-families.''
Section 6715, which is the section set out in full
above, and the section which is under attack here, expressly p·ermits two-family dwellings in residential "A''
district. It also expressly ·permits all uses which are
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ordinary appurtenant to two-family dwellings. In regard to one-family dwellings, Section 5 provides that
only 6 persons may be taken for lodging or for board,
or for both purposes. And then it is expressly provided
as f ollo"rs :
''Provided, however, that these provisions
shall not be applicable to a two-family dwelling.''
In line with our general discussion above relating
to the construction of (b) and the divisions th.ereunder
as limitations rather than as grants of the right to occupy premises, there can be little doubt that two-family
dwellings are without limitation as to the number of
boarders or lodgers who may live under one roof. Certainly it is incidental to the occupation of a home as a
two-family dwelling, that boarders and lodgers be ·permitted to live therein. In fact, the definition of ''family''
in Section 6713, makes it clear that boarders and lodgers
may be included within the f.amily. Reference to the
definition shows that any number of individuals living
together as a ''single housekeeping unit'' is a family,
and in a two-family dwelling, two of such units may
live in the house. In addition to that, all uses which are
ordinarily appurtenant, or incidental thereto may also
be carried on on the premises. In regard to one-family
dwellings, the statute expressly prohibits the renting
of rooms or the furnishing of meals or a combination
of rooms and meals to more than 6 p·ersons. But it goes
on to say expressly that the limitations will not app~ly
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ings may go on unrestricted in the number of renters
and boarders that may be taken into the home.
Under the decided cases, this is expressly condemned.· The best case on . this is Merrill vs. City of
Wheaton, (Ill.) 190 N .E. 918. In this case an ordinance
limited a particular district to single-family dwellings.
Two-family dwellings were ·p,rohibited. Merrill wanted
to change a one-family dwelling to a two-family dwelling
and the city would not let him. The court held the ordinance unconstitutional as unreasonable and discriminatory because it permitted one family dwellings to take
boarders and thus bring many people under one roof
but prohibited two family dwellings. It thus held that
there was no reasonable basis for the distinction. The
court said:
"Its application here results in unfair discrimination, without any corresponding benefit
to the public health, morals, safety or w-elfare.
Certainly the public health is not promoted by
an ordinance which restricts the right of one
property owner to erect or alter a residence to
house two families separately under one roof,
and at the same time permits as many as twentyeight boarders and roomers to legally make use
of .another residence in the same block. The
morals, welfare, and safety of the public are not
especially subserved by boarding and rooming
houses as com'pared with two-family residences
-at least not to the extent of justifying a legislative act which favors one and forbids the
other.''
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C.

THE

ORDIN.A.~lNCE

CRI1lll~"'.L-1TES
PL.A-11~-rTIFF

AGAINST

UNREASONABLY DISTH'E

PROPERTY

OF

H.A.1TCH.

It appeared \Yithout dispute in the evidence that
the present ordinance \vas, in fact, causing the fraternities and sororities incident to the University of Utah,
to congest in the 600 foot area to the north of the University campus. It is in this area that Dr. Hatch resides.
Within the past nine pears, since the 600 foot limitation
was imposed, 4 new fraternity and sorority houses have
located in the 600 foot district. The testimony of Doean
Ballif demonstrates that there are perhaps seven more
fraternity groups looking for houses now. The area
to the east and to the south is closed to the students.
The area to the north is closed except within the 600
foot strip. New fraternal groups as they come upon the
campus have two alternatives: (1) They can locate to
the west, or (2) They can locate within the 600 foot
limit. Regardless of what might be available to the
west, the students are in fact, locating within the 600
foot strip. The University has more than doubled in
size since 1939, and fraternal groups on the campus are
definitely on the increase. The addition of all the fraternal units within this '600 foot strip, without question,
results in congested parking, and congested living quarters, and of course, greatly restricts the use by Dr.
Hatch of his property. There is no dispute in the evidence concerning the above facts.
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Mr. Woolley, who is the chief planner for Salt Lake
City, and the only expert who testified, gave it as his
opinion, that there w.as no essential difference in the
property to the north of the University campus located
within the 600 foot strip and the prop.erty located without the 600 foot strip over in Federal Heights area. That
all of the ·property, both that within and that without
the 600 foot limit, were ·equally well adapted to use as
selected residential property. Nevertheless, the City
. has, upon petition by one group of the residents of that
exclusive area, drawn a line which has forced the fraternity groups right into the laps of all other property
owners in that '600 foot area. There is nothing in the
evidence even to suggest a reason why Dr. Hatch should
have fraternities on ·every side of him, and why the
other users, immediately adjacent to the 600 foot line
in Federal Heights, should to no extent be bothered by
such congestion. In fact, the only testimony on this is
the testimony of Mr. Woolley who said that there was
no difference whatever in the character of the two areas
for home property. That they were built up together
as a part of the same gener.al development. That each
was equally well adapted to home ·property, and still
are equally well adapted. They are contiguous and occupy the same narrow area of the city. Mr. Woolley
also admitted that the area has so built up with fraternity houses now, that it would he detrimental to the health,
morals and welfare of the people to continue to have
that area built up with fraternity homes. That more
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homes added to the traffic congestion and general problem would only make the matter worse. (R. 103)
As will be pointed out in more detail hereafter, the
only justification for zoning ordinances is that they relate to and tend to promote the public health, safety
and welfare. This, they must do without unreasonable
discrimination. Whenever a wning ordinance in its
practical ap.plication does not promote the health, safety
or welfare, or whenever the same is discriminatory, the
courts have without hesitation, held the same to be
unconstitutional. This will be discussed in considerable detail later. We think the record demonstrates that
it does not promote the p·ublic health, safety or welfare,
to continue to congest the fraternities in the 600-foot
area. The only two reasons Mr. Woolley could give
why the ordinance was passed and the only two objectives which he said it was intended to meet, was to solve
the parking problem and to keep the fraternities closer
to the University so that they could be supervised. (R.
94) He now admits that the congestion of fraternities
is already bad .and that further location of fraternities
in this area would be worse. (R. 103) Every witness
who testified on the subject admitted that the parking
problem is better met by having the fraternity houses
dispersed into wider areas rather than congregated into
narrow areas. There was positive evidence that the
existing fraternities own 281 cars and operate them
around the campus and around their homes, or a total
of over 17 cars per house. (R. 76) Certainly it would
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ignore common sense to contend that the parking ·problems and congested conditions are better met by having
more fraternity and sorority hous.es crowded into this
one congested area. Of course, the city says they could
move to the west and farther to the south, where they
would be in .a "B '' zone, but as a practical matter, the
fraternities are not doing so. Further the record affirmatively shows that to ·put them into the "B" areas
of the city, where they may permissibly build, and be
outside the 600-foot limit forces them to distances far
removed from the University. The shaded map introduced by the city shows an area shaded in red where
fraternities may locate. This of course, is the 600-foot
limit to the north of the University and all of the residential '' B '' area. To the east, and to the south of the
University campus, there is no land within 600 feet
where fraternities may locate. To the north there is
the narrow 600-foot strip, and everything else to the
north of the campus is residential ''A'' or residential
'' AA' ', where fraternities are not permitted. This leaves
only the area shaded in red to the west, and far to the
south. If fraternities are forced into those areas, it will
defeat the second objective of the ordinance - keeping
the fraternities close to the University so they can be
supervised. Therefore~ either way one looks at it, the
objective expressed by Mr. Woolley is defeated. The
600-foot limitation causes congestion and crowding because of the fact that there is only one residential "A"
district close to the University of Utah, and that is the
area to the north. The rest of the area to the north and
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to the east, and to the south, is closed. The result is
if they stay close to the University, they must crowd
within the 600-foot strip and parking problems and
congestion results. If they were to move into the .area
to the 'vest, they would move far distant from the
University. As a practical matter, they are congesting
the 600-foot area, all to the detriment of Dr. Hatch.
There would appear to be no reason, after having
expressly provided that fraternity and sorority houses
and dormitories could be constructed .and maintained in
a residential "A" district, that they would then be
restricted to locations within 600 feet of the schools.
Is there anything whatsoever related to the health,
morals, safety or general welfare of the community
which requires fraternities and sororities to be that
close to the school to which they ,afie incident? That is
really the only thing that the ordinance would ostensibly
accomplish. They are permitted to build anywhere in
residential "A" district so long as they stay within
600 feet of the property occupied by the educational institution. Schools may move about in the ''A'' district
wherever they may elect. Wherever the University goes
with its properties, occupied by it for educational purposes, sororities and fraternities may fan out an additional 600 feet throughout the residential ''A'' district.
Therefore, the only possible thing that the ordinance
could, .and in fact does accomplish is to kee-p· fraternities close to the campus. This causes congestion, parking, -and traffic problems. The ordinance, however, doe,s
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mitted to move 10 miles from the campus in commercial,
industrial, or residential "B" districts. Therefore, under the ordinance, they may move to locations which are
far removed from the University and there is no possible construction under which fraternities and sororities
could be compelled by this ordinance, to locate their
houses close to the University campus. The restriction
is only that they locate that close if they locate in residential ''A'' district. This surely could not assure the
public safety.
The ordinance also permits the maintenance ·.Of fraternity and sorority houses anywhere within a residential ''A'' district, so long as they are that close to
the property occupied by the institution. No one can
be assured just which part of the ''A'' district will
inherit the fraternities because schools can move anywhere in the district. No particular ·portion of any residential ''A'' district is by ordinance protected against
fr.aternities because of this freedom given to schools.
Wherever schools may go - fraternities may follow.
This was demonstrated by the recent acquisition of Fort
Douglas hy the University. With this acquisition, fraternities could have invaded the most exclusive area in
Federal Heights. The city blocked this by its new ordi;.
nance setting up the double ''A'' zone. Still the remainder of the ''A'' districts of the city are open to fraternities if the schools expand in to the particular area. The
net result of the ordinance is to attempt to keep fraternities in ''A'' districts close to the campus. This is
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unreasonable because fraternities in '' B'' districts do
not need to stay close to the school.
The United States Supreme Court in Seattle Trust Co.
YS. Roberge~ (infra.) indicates that the city has by this
ordinance expressed the legislative opinion that it is a
proper "A" residential use for fraternities to locate in
''.A. '' districts subject to the condition that they remain
within 600 feet of the campus. We respectfully submit
that there is nothing relating to the health, morals,
safety or general welfare which is subserved by p~ermit
ting fraternities to build homes within 600 feet from
the campus in residential ''A'' district, and prohibiting
the construction of a fraternity home 650 feet away
from the campus in the same district. Nor is there
any basis for a requirement that fraternities. stay within
600 feet if they locate in residential ''A'' districts, but
letting them locate miles away if they locate in residential ''B''. Why a fraternity house located 650 feet
from the campus in residential ''A'' district, is more
detrimental to the public health, welfare, morals and
safety than a fraternity house located '600 feet from the
campus, also in the "A" district, is to us without any
explanation.
The 600 foot restriction forces discrimination between persons who live within th.e residential ''A'' district. It congests fraternities near residential" A'' users
like Dr. Hatch, .and excludes them from other residential "A" areas. Both areas in residential "A" district have by the city been found to be alike, and to he
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entitled to be treated alike in so far as zoning is concerned, for both areas are in residential" A" area. The
600 foot line is simply .a capricious effort on the part
of the City Commission to favor a group of citizens
residing in Federal Heights, who do not want fraternities around them; and in order to escape from having
fraternities located around them, they have succeeded
in lobbying through the City Commission, an ordinance
which forces the fraternities either to locate in "B"
districts at points distant from the University or crowds
all of them around the other ''A'' residential users,
such as Dr. Hatch. There simply cannot be any reasonable relationship between health, morals, safety and
welfare which will permit a fraternity house to locate
at a point 600 feet from the campus within residential
"A" district, .and will prohibit the same fraternity from
locating a ·point 650 feet from the campus in the same
residential district within the same city.
This particular discrimination oould have been
eliminat·ed by excluding fraternities from residential
''A'' districts entirely. This the ordinance does not do.
It expressly permits fraternities to locate in residential
"A'' - thus finding that such use of property is harmonious with residential" A" uses, and then it limits the
places in the ''A'' district where they may locate. All
property owners in .an "A" district are entitled to the
same treatment. The city has so admitted by putting
them in the same district. Mr. Woolley said that he
could see no difference in Hatch's property and other
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areas in the '' . .\'' district for residential use. Then the
city discriminates against Hatch and tells him he must
have fraternity houses located in his neighborhood and
the ordinance assures that n1ore will locate there.

THE ORDINANCE IS UNREASONABLY
DISCRIMINATORY IN THAT IT IS DlRE~CTED·
ONLY A·GAINST THE UNIVER.SITY OF UTAH
AND FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES APPURTENANT THERETO.
D.

It app·ears quite clear from the evidence, that the
University of Utah was the objective of this particular
ordinance.

The official minutes of the Zoning and

Planning Committee use the words: ''This means the
University of Utah", in referring to this particular ordinance. It also appears that the ordinance, subdivision
6, vvas amended to place the 600 foot restriction because
of a petition filed by residents of Federal Heights,
objecting to the expansion of fraternity houses on Parry
Avenue. The matter was referred to the Zoning and
Planning Commission, for study. Mr. Woolley, who is
the head of the Zoning and Planning Commission, stated
that they studied the problem, but he admits that the
only area studied was the area north of the University
of Utah, and that it is the only area he knew of where
there was a fraternity problem (R. 107). In th·e recommendation made to the City Commission, the Zoning and
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Planning Commission said in their official minutes that
the 600-foot limitation meant the University of Utah.
In addition to this we have the fact that they picked
the arbitrary line of 600 feet and when Mr. Woolley was
asked why 600 feet was picked, he said that this was
done because 600 feet would exactly encompass all existing fraternities at the University of Utah (R. 114). The
map introduced shows the 600 foot line at the top of the
map cutting immediately behind the fraternity house
which is located the fartherest to the north and which was
established prior to 1939. Therefore, it s~eems unmistakably clear that the ordinance was directed toward
the University of Utah. The 600-foot limit, the minutes,
the study made by the Zoning Commission, the petition which activated and later impelled the passing of
the ordinance, all so suggest. It is discriminatory, and
class legislation, we contend, to segregate from a city,
the fraternity and sorority houses of the University of
Utah and pass restrictive zoning ordinances just for
them. This is not particularly assigned as an individual
ground for declaring the ordinance in question to be
unconstitutional. However, 'vhen this fact is taken into
account, the other ·points which are urged take an additional weight and meaning. The contention of Dr. Hatch,
that the zoning ordinance forces fraternity houses into
his "back-yard", is bolstered by the fact that the zoning ordinance ·was designed to confine fraternities of
the University of Utah all within an area close to his
home.
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E. THE 600-FOOT RESTRICTION IS ARBTTRARI~, CAPRICIOUS .AND WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE B.A818.
It seems clear that the ordinance was designed
solely to meet the particular situation existing at the
University of Utah. Notwithstanding this, the Zoning
Commission drew a line through the area to the
north of the campus which went through houses and
lots indiscriminately. The line cuts through Dr. Hatch's
lot and house and cuts through the houses and lots of
many of the other residents of the area. Since the Zoning ordinance was directed toward this particular area,
we think that it is highly irregular, arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable for the city to put the line
right up through the middle of part of the peop.Je's
property. We think we have demonstrated under
the evidence as set forth above, that the ordinanee was
directed toward the University of Utah,. and the protection of the Federal Heights area. There can be no
reasonable justification for the extension of a flat 600foot line which was directed toward a particular area
and yet was directed indiscriminately through houses,
and lots. We think that any ordinance that does '30
is unconstitutional, that it is unreasonable and discriminatory to put one particular building lot half in residential ''A'' district, and half in a district where
fraternities are permitted to live. It is unconstitutional to take a ·particular house and put half of that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40

house in an area where fraternities can live and the
other half of the house in an area where fraternities
cannot live. And this is particularly so where the ordinance in question was directed at this particular area.
There :are several cases holding expressly that under such circumstances, the ordinance is unconstitutional and void. The first of these cases is Buffalo
Park Land vs. Buffalo, 126 Miscellaneous 207, 294
N.Y.S. 413. There, a zoning ordinance divided a 60-foot
lot so as to place 40 feet of that :parcel in a residential
district and the other 20 feet in an apartment hotel
district. The ordinance was held to be unconstitutional
and unreasonable. This was true, even though the entire block of the city in which said lot was located was
so divided by the line, the block was 2200 feet in length
and 225 feet in width. The particular zoning ordinance
was directed only toward that ·city block .and it was held
unreasonab~e,

arbitrary, and discriminatory to so bisect

a building lot with a line that 40 feet w-as in a residential
district where only homes could be built and the other
part of the lot was in a hotel district where hotels and
apartments could be built.
See also the case of Fouss vs. McConnel, Ga., 157
S. E. '625. There, by ordinance, the city of Atlanta
zoned the first 122 feet of a group of lots into residential
use only and the back 100 feet for business. The court
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in holding the ordinance unconstitutional said as follows:

'' ... If the zoning ordinance restricts the use
of his lot to residential purposes other than the
front 100 feet, then said ordinance, as it seeks
to divide his lot into two separate use classes by
zoning the first 100 feet to business and restricting the rear 120 feet to residential use is unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional.''
This case is strengthened by the fact that it was
the University of Utah area at which the city was
"shooting". The courts lay down the uniform rule
that in determining the constitutionality of .a statute,
the locality and the circumstances, are to be considered
and the matter is not to be resolved by abstractions.
See Women's Kansas City St. Andrews Society vs.
Kansas City, 54 Fed. 2d, 1071. Where there is only one
group of fraternities and sororities in the city and only
one institution to which they are appurtenant, and where
the complaint arises over that particular area and the
Zoning and Planning Commission in making their study
of the city to see where the line should go, studied only
the University area, and where in their recommendations to the City Commission, they say we mean the
University of Utah, and where the 600-foot line is picked
to fit this particular locality and is 'picked so as to
exactly encompass the house fartherest removed from
the campus, and then the city strikes a line down through
the middle of houses and properties, such legislation is
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highly unreasonable and arbitrary; and of course, the
plaintiff Hatch is in a position to complain because his
property and his house are S'plit by the 600-foot line.

F. THERE IS NO ~CONSTIT·UTIONAL BASIS
FOR SEGREGATING FR:OM R·EBID·ENTIAL
USERS, PE'R.SONS WHO USE RESIDENTIAL
PROPEilTY FOR F~ATERNITY AND SORORITY
HOUSES.

In approaching this problem, we must confess that
there is not a great deal of law written specifically on
the subject of fraternities. The only case which we
have been able to find, dealing directly with fraternities,
is an early Nebraska ease entitled Pettis v. Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 111 Neb. 525, 213 N. W. 835. This
case holds tha~ fraternities are subject to separate classification. The case has not subsequently been cited or
followed. We have been unable to find another case
directly involving fraternitie-s. Our reasoning on this
point must, therefore, be by analogy.
The power of a municipal corpora~tion to enact zoning ordinances is nothing but the exercise of the state
police power. Cities have the right to exercise the police
power of the state only to the extent that power is expressly delegated by statute. In the case of cities and
towns in Utah, the delegation of the police p·ower is
contained in Section 15-8-89 Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
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The delegation is in broad and sweeping language. Still
cities may only exercise the power to zone for the purpose of ''promoting health, safety, morals and the general "~elfare of ~the community". Without the statutory delegation, there would be no power in the city to
zone at all. With the statutory delegation, cities may
zone for the purposes set out in the statu·te. Even without such a statutory limitation, principles of constitutional law "\Vould and do prohibit zoning except to promote the health, morals, safety and general welfare of
the people. Even though the statute tends to promote
one of those objectives, it is unconstitutional if, in doing so, it unreasonably discriminates against any p-articular class. There are numerous cases to this effect
throughout the books. We set forth 'below comments
from some of the most recent cases. Each of the cases
cited below is a recent case rep.resenting the present
state of the law.
The first case, Geneva Investment Company vs.
City of St. Louis, 87 Fed. 2d, 83, held that zoning ordinances regulating the use of realty under power conferred by statute must tend to promote the public health,
safety, or welfare without discrimination. In Acker vs.
Baldwin, (Cal. S. Ct.) 108 P. 2d. 899, the court said that
in considering the validity of zoning ordinances, courts
must determine in addition to the need thereof, whether
they are arbitrary or discriminatory in their conception and application and whether they have any reasonable tendency to promote the public morals, health,
safety or general welfare, and prosperity of the comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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munity. In a recent Nebraska case, Cassel Realty Co. v.
City of Omaha, 14 N.W. 2d. 600, the court held that a
zoning ordinance restricting building uses, must not be
discriminatory, unreasonable nor arbitrary, and must
bear some relationship to the purposes sought to be accomplished. In Landu vs. Levin, a Missouri case, 213
S.W. 2d. 483, the court held that all use restrictions and
legislative enactments of a city must not only be reasonable but also must not discriminate and they must further
fairly tend to be of value and have substantial relationship to some purpose for which the city may exercis-e its
police power. To the same effect, see National House
vs. Board of Adjustments, a New Jersey case, 61 Atlantic 2d. 55; Fass v. City of Highland Park, a Michigan case, 32 N.W. 2d. 375; George v. Hall, Wyoming 199
P. 2d. 815; Thompson on Real property, Section 5615,
Volume 10. Without laboring this point further we submit that zoning ordinances are only valid if they tend
to promote the public welfare, health, morals or safety,
and unless this is done without unreasonable discrimination between persons or classes situated alike.
By p·ermitting schools to exist throughout residential ''A'' districts, and then permitting fraternities and
sororities to locate their houses in "A" districts, so
long as they stay within 600 feet of the school, the ordinance affirmatively shows that the legislative authority
of the city, did riot consider the establishment of fraternities in "A" districts to be bad in and of itself.
This legislation by the city merely suggests that fraternities and sororities are bad if they locate more than
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600 feet from the campus, but are good if they locate
"ithin that area in ''A'' district. There w·ould be no
reason whatever ~vhy this fraternity group could not
reside in the very house where it now resides if the
University of Utah would sim:ply acquire some IP'rop·erty
within 600 feet of this particular house and main-ta.in
thereon an observatory, a greenhouse, a labora.tory, a
classroom, or any other plant of the University. In other
words, the ordinance does not provide that fraternities
and sororities may not reside in residential ''A'' district. It provides merely that they may only reside in
''A'' districts if they stay within 600 feet of the campus.
The school, of course, may be established in ''A'' district,
anywhere that any school decides that it desires to locate. Without restriction, the University of Utah could
move throughout the residential "A'' district, and buy,
lease or occupy land, and if it did so, fraternity houses
could follow it anywhere in Salt Lake City. The ordinance therefore, does not suggest that fraternity and
sorority houses are bad, but only that they are bad if
located more than 600 feet away from the school property. That such connotation must be read into the ordinance is made clear by the United States Supreme Court
in the case of State Ex Rei Seattle Trust Company v.
Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50. In that case the
ordinance in question was almost verbatim to the one
under construction here, except for the 600-foot limitation. It had, however, one additional provision after
permitting fraternities, sororities, and dormitories ordinarily appurtenant to colleges to locate in "A'' disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tricts, in that it provided that philanthropic homes for
children or aged :people might be constructed in residential ''A'' district if the consent of two-thirds of the
people within a certain number of feet of the proposed
building could be obtained. The Supreme Court held that
this language permitting homes for the aged and for
children to be constructed in residential ''A'' affirmatively showed that the legislative arm of the city did not
consider the maintenance of such homes in ''A'' districts
to be inconsistent with the use of the districts for residential purposes. In this regard the Supreme Court said:
''The right of the trustee to devote his land
to any legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution. The facts disclosed
by the record make it clear that the exclusion
of the new home from the first district is not indis'pensible to the general zoning plan. And there
is no legislative determination that the proposed
building would be inconsistent with public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. The enactment itself plainly suggests the contrary.''
The ordinance is set out in full in the United States
Supreme Court opinion, it is almost verbatim to the one
under construction here. The United States Supreme
Court has construed it as an affirmative indication by
the city that the maintenance of such homes in residential ''A'' districts are not inconsistent with the general zoning plan, nor inconsistent with, nor harmful
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
There is no escap~e from the conclusion that the city has ·
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by its legislative enactment determined that the manttenance of fraternity and sorority houses and dormitories in an ''.A'' district is not inconsistent with the maintenance of residences, nor detrimental to the public
health, 'Yelfare, morals or safety. Otherwise they 'vould
not be permitted in such districts.

It is extremely difficult for us to see any reasonable or constitutional basis which makes a fraternity in
a residential "A" district a menace to the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare, if it gets beyond
600 feet and yet makes it harmonious with, and helpful
to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare
to establish fraternity houses in residential ''A'' district if they stay within 600 feet of the University campus. The ordinance cannot be justified as an attempt·
to preserve a particular area exclusively for home properties because the ordinance expressly p·ermits in addition to homes, the maintenance of the following uses:
(1) Schools, (2) Churches, (3) Libraries and Museums,
(4) Public parks, public recreation grounds and playgrounds, (5) Farming and truck gardening, nurseries,
greenhouses, railroad or street railway p·as·senger station, and rights of way, including railroad y:ards or
sheds, (6) all public buildings except penal or mental
institutions, and (7) telephone exchanges. All of these,
and all appurtenant uses to these may be maintained in
residential ''A'' district, and may locate .anywhere within an ''A'' district. The .appurtenant uses, as further
defined, include the carrying on of the profession of
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a physician, musician, or other ·professional person,
the maintenance of rooming and boarding houses, dormitories, fraternity and sorority houses, if they stay within
600 feet of the campus. Since the campus may be extended anywhere throughout the residential ''A'' district, there is no assurance that any particular area in
the ''A'' district, will in practical operation not be
invaded by fraternity and sorority houses. If the University were to acquire or occupy property within 600
feet of the home now occupied by the plaintiff fraternity
houses, it would be harmonious, according to the ordinance, with the public health, morals, and welfare, for
this fraternity house to be continued exactly as it is,
and it would not be injurious to the health, morals or
safety of the people who live adjacent to it. Why fraternities are bad in so far as the public health, morals,
safety and general welfare are concerned if they locate
in an ''A'' district beyond 600 feet from the campus
and good if they stay within that distance, escapes us.
The Illinois case cited above, which holds that it
IS unconstitutional tQ permit schools to locate in residential ''A'' districts, and then prohibit dormitories
from locating in the same district, seems to us to be
directly in p.oin t in this regard.
There are many other cases which we think have
an important bearing on this point. The cases uniformly
hold that it is improper, unconstitutional, and unreasonable to attempt to exclude churches from a residential
''A'' district. There is nothing promoting the health,
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morals, public safety, or general welfare which creates
a residential ''A'' district, and excludes therefrom
churches. All of the cases are to this effect. See Synod
of Ohio, United Lutheran v. Joseph, 139 Ohio State 229,
39 N.E. 2d. 515; City of Sherman vs. Simms, 143 Texas
115, 183 S.W. 2d. 415; Ellsworth vs. Gercke, Ariz. case,
15'6 P. 2d. 242; Overbrook Farms Club vs. Town Zoning
Board, 351 Pa. 77, 40 At. 2d. 423; Thompson on Real
Property, Section 5626; State Ex Rel Roman Bishop
of Reno vs. Hill, a Nevada case, 90 P. 2d. 217. All of
these cases are recent cases, several of. them d-ecided by
western jurisdictions and all of them uniformly hold
that it is unconstitutional to attempt to exclude from a
residential ''A'' district, the establishment of churches.
All of them are based upon the considevation that to
exclude churches has no constitutional relationship hetween the public health, morals, safety and general welfare, and that an ordinance which excludes churches
from a residential "A" district is void.
The next line of cases which we think indicate th:at
a like result ought to obtain in the case of fraternities
is the case of Village of University Heights vs. Clevel~and
Jewish Orphans Home. Circuit Court of appeals, 6th
circuit, 20 F. 2d. 745, wherein the court says:
''The structural plans of the proposed orphanage comply with all requirements of the village.
There is no objection to the buildings per se, but
only to the use of them as a home for a large
number of children. If they were intended for a
private school, or for private residences, their
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use as such would and could not be prohibited.
The question is whether the 'proposed use is so
different in character from concededly legitimate
uses, as to bring it within the scope of the police
power of the municipality. That.·power has been
held, as we have seen, to include the right generally to exclude business houses, stores, shops,
and apartment houses from strictly residential
areas. It has never been held the right to prohibit
the use for orphan children of cottages built according to the requirements of the municipality.
We can see many valid reasons, affecting the
public welfare, that would justify the exclusion
of factories, business houses, shops and even
apartment houses from the strictly residential
districts, but such would not apply to the use of
structurally 'proper cottages for an orphanage;
while an orphanage would no doubt be disagreeable to the community in some respects than a
private school or private residences, we are unwilling to hold that it is within the power of
the village to prohibit the use of cottages of this
character for that purpose.''
In Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society vs.
Kansas City, Mo., a Circuit Court of Appeals case,
eight circuit, 58 F. 2d. 597, the court said:
"The chief objection to plaintiff's coming in
to the neighborhood seems to have come from the
residents· of the Rockhill district, and from the
trustees of the various trusts connected with the
William Rockhill Nelson Art Gallery. * * * The
owner of the adjoining duplexes testified that
having an old ladies' home as an immediate
neighbor would diminish the value of his property, and it would affect his morals to have it
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referred •to as the old ladies' home next door '
* * • Zoning laws rest upon the '·police p·ower of
the states, and ""'hen they are fairly within the
well-recognized bounds of such power they are
valid, even though they may entail some hardship upon property owners. While such police
power is broad, there are limitations to its exercise, which the courts have not attempted to accurately, define. However, restrictions by zoning ordinances imposed upon the use of one's
property to be valid must bear some substantial
relationship to the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare.' The reserved police power
of the state must stop when it encroaches on the
protection accorded the citizen by the Federal
Constitution. * * * Certainly the fact that aged
people may have a depressing effect on some
people is not sufficient to exclude such people
from a district. There is no limit to the causes
that may depress people, but they do not furnish
a basis for the support of a restriction as to
use of one's property. What was said by the
Texas court in Spann vs. City of Dallas et al.,
111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513, 516, 19 A.L.R. 1387,
with respect to the noise and annoyance incident
to the operation of a grocery store in a residential district, would apply a fortiori to the socalled 'depressing influence' of elderly residents,
viz.: 'It could disturb or impair the comfort of
only highly sensitive persons. But laws are not
made to suit the acute sensibiliti~s of such persons. It is with common humanity - the average
of the people, that police laws must deal. A lawful and ordinary use of prop.erty is not to be p-rohibited because repugnant to the sentiments of
a p~articular class.' * * * There must be limits as
to what even a general plan may do, and the
mere comprehensiveness of the zoning ordinance
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is in itself no justification for each separate restriction that the ordinance imposes. * * * If the
restriction here complained of does in fact, however, have no relationship to the fundamentals
upon which zoning statutes can be sustained, viz.
public health, safety, moral, and general welfare, and is not essential to a general zoning
ordinance based on these considerations, then
the courts should not hesitate to protect plaintiff
from being deprived of the use of its prop.erty
under the guise of police power. * * * Our conclusion is that the restriction upon the use of
plain tiff's property is not an essential of the
general zoning plan, and is in its application to
plaintiff's property so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be void.''
Western Theological Seminary vs. Evanston, supra,
as the title implies, concerned a theological seminary.
Part of the opinion in that case reads as follows (325 Ill.
511, 156 N.E. 783.) :

''Both liber:ty and property are subject to
the police power of the state, under which new
burdens may be imposed on property and new
restrictions placed on its use when the public
welfare demands it. The police power is, however, limited to enactments having reference to
the public health, comfort, safety, or welfare.
An act which deprives a citizen of his liberty or
prop.erty rights cannot be sustained under the
'police power unless a due regard for the public
health, comfort, safety, or welfare requires it.
Ruhstrat vs. People, supra, (185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E.
41, 49 L.R.A. 181, 76 Am. St. Rep. 30) ; Bailey
v. People, 190 Ill. 28, 60 N.E. 98, 54 L.R.A. 838,
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83 Am. St. Rep. 116; Bessette v. People, 193 Ill.
334, 62 N .E. :215, 56 L.R.A. 558; People vs. City
of Chicag-o, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609, 49 L.R.A.,
N.S., 438, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 292; Catholic Bishop
vs. Villag·e of Palos Park, 286 Ill. 400, 121 N.E.
561. The legislative determination as to what is
a proper exercise of the police p.ower is not conclusive. Whether the means employed have any
real, substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety, or welfare, or are arbitrary and
unreasonable, is a question which is subject to
review by the courts, and in determining that
question the courts will disregard mere forms
and interfere for the protection of rights injuriously affected by arbitrary and unreasonable action. City of Aurora vs. Burns, supra (319 Ill.
84, 149 N.E. 784)."

The court proceeded to hold unconstitutional an ordinance which permitted schools in an "A" district but
excluded dormitories.
A home for aged poor was the subject matter of

State of Washington ex rei. Seattle Title Trust Co. vs.
Roberge, supra. In the opinion of the court in that case,
we find the following (278 U.S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 51):
''Zoning measures must find their justification in the police power exerted in the interest of
the public. Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Co., sup.ra,
(272 U.S. 365), 387 (47 S. Ct. (114) 118 (71 L.
Ed·. (303), 310, 54 A.L.R. 1016) ). 'The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations
with the general rights of the landowner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited
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and, other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.' Nectow v. Cambridge, supra
(277 U.S. 183), page 188 (48 S. Ct. (477), 448,
(72 L. Ed. 842, 844) ). Legislatures, may not, under the guise of the police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary ~and unreasonable upon
the use of private property or the pursuit of
useful activities. * * * It is not suggested that
the proposed new home for aged poor would
be a nuisance. We find nothing in the record
reasonably tending to show that its construction
or maintenance is liable to work any injury, inconvenience or annoyance to the community, the
district or any person .. The facts shown clearly
distinguish the proposed building and use from
·such billboards or other uses which by reason of
their nature are liable to be offensive.''
In the City of Miami Beach v. State, supra, the
Supreme Court of Florida was called upon to consider the validity of an ordinance ·prohibiting private
schools in a multiple £amily district while permitting
public schools. The ordinance was held invalid because
·''it ap.pears to be arbitrary and unreasonable and has
no relation to the public safety, health, morals, comfort, or general welfare.''
The burden is placed by the courts upon the city
to point out the reasonableness of the basis for any
discrimination made by an ordinance, see 22 C.J. 141;
Deaver v. Napier, '139 Minn. 219, 166 N.W. 187; Christ
v. Fent, 16 Okla. 375,.84 P. 1074; State v. Joseph (Ohio)
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39 N.E. 2d. 515; Applestein v. Mayor-of-Baltimore, 156
Md. 40, 47, 143 Atl. 666.
We submit that the ordinance in question is invalid
both as to this plaintiff fraternity and as to Dr. Hatch.
This court should so declare.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing discussion and authorities
cited in support thereof, we earnestly urge this. honorable court to declare Section '6715, Chapter 65 to be unconstitutional, unreasonable and discriminatory and to
reverse the judgment of the trial court accordingly.

Respectfully submitted.
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE
Attorneys for .Ap·pellant
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